Layton City v. James Bennett : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1987
Layton City v. James Bennett : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Scott R. Wangsgard; Conder & Wangsgard; attorney for appellant.
Steven Garside; attorney for respondent.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Layton City v. Bennett, No. 870038 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/325
UTAH COUBT OF APPEAL 
UTAH 
DOG'J V £ N i 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. 
$7003 8 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LAYTON CITY, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
JAMES BENNETT, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 8I70038-CA 
H 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL, PETITION FOR REVIEW 
Appeal from Fourth Circuit Court, State of Utah, Davis County, 
Layton Department. 
Judge: Judge K. Roger Bean 
SCOTT R. WANGSGARD 
CONDER & WANGSGARD 
Attorney for Appellant 
4059 S. 4000 W. 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
STEVEN GARSIDE 
Layton City Prosecutor 
43 7 North Wasatch Drive 
Layton, Utah 84041 
STEVEN GARSIDE SCOTT R. WANGSGARD 
« * APR 21 1987 ^ 
COURT OF APPEALS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Table of Authorities 3 
Jurisdiction of the Court 5 
Statement of the Issues Presented for Appeal 6 
Statutes and Rules for Review 7 
Statement of the Case 11 
Summary of Arguments 17 
Argument 18 
Conclusion 42 
Addendum . .....* 44 
2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
1. Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
i.e., Article Four, 7, 20, 21, 24, 27 
2. Article 1, Section 14, Utah Constitution 7, 24, 27 
3. Article 8, Section 4, Utah Constitution 7, 39 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Section 41-6-44.3 7, 36, 37, 38, 39 
Utah Code Section 77-7-15 8, 24, 27 
Utah Code Section 77-35-18, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Rule 18 8, 33, 34 
Utah Code Section 78-2a-3(2) (c) 5 
CASES: PAGE: 
Brown v. Texas 443 U.S. 47, (1979) 23, 25 
Camara v. Municipal Court 387 U.S. 523, 534-535, 
536-537, (1967) 22 
Jenkins v. Parrish 627 P.2d 533 (1981) 31 
Murray v^ Hall 6 63 P. 2d 1314 (1983) 39, 41 
Reynolds y_;_ U.S. 98 U.S. 145 (1978) 28, 29 
Robinson v. Durand 36 Utah 93, 104 Pac 1314 (1908) 9, 28 
State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, (1980)., 9, 28, 29 
State v. Carpena 714 P. 2d (1986) , 25, 26 
State v. Chealy, 116 P.2d 377 (1941) 29 
State v. Constantino 732 P. 2d 125 (1987).., 26 
State v^ _ Hanson 588 P. 2d 164 (1978) 9, 36 
State v. Hewitt 689 P. 2d 22 (1984) 31, 32 
3 
State v. Lacey 665 P.2d 1311 (1983) 31 
State v^ Moore 5 62 P. 2d 629 (1977) 30, 31 
State v. Nielson, 727 P.2d 188, (1986) 32 
State v. Swanigan 699 P.2d 718 (1985) 24, 25 
Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1967) 20, 21, 22 
RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Preliminary Note to Utah Rules of Evidence 8, 36 
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 101 9, 36 
Rule 801(c) 9, 37 
Rule 802 9, 37 
Rule 803(6) 9, 37, 38 
Rule 803(8) 10, 37, 38 
AGENCY RULES AND REGULATIONS: 
A copy of the applicable Regulations of the Commissioner of 
Public Safety of the State of Utah is attached in the addendum. 
4 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This appeal is taken from the Fourth Circuit Court of the 
State of Utah, Davis County, Layton Department and jurisdiction 
is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to the 
provisions of Utah Code Section 78-2a-3 (2) (c) which states, in 
part, as follows: 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(c) appeals from the circuit courts; 
This is an appeal from a final judgment rendered in the 
Fourth Circuit Court of Davis County, State of Utah in which the 
Defendant/Appellant was convicted and sentenced for violating 
Layton City Code Section 41-6-44. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Should all of the evidence obtained by the Layton police 
from the Appellant have been suppressed? 
2. Did the Court improperly deny the Appellant's request 
that two of the jurors be dismissed for cause? 
3# Should the evidence concerning the results of the 
"intoxilyzer" test have been admitted by the Court at trial and 
subsequently submitted to the jury? 
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STATUTES AND RULES FOR REVIEW 
*United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment, states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable casuse, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly des-
cribing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
*Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14, states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause supported 
by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
*Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4, states: 
The supreme court shall adopt rules of procedure 
and evidence to be used in the course of the state and 
shall by rule mangae the appellate process. The 
legislature may amend the rules of procedure and 
evidence adopted by the supore court upon a vote of two-
thirds of all members of both houses of the 
legislature. . . . 
*Utah Code Section 41-6-44.3, passed into law in 1979 and 
amended in 1983, states: 
(1) The commissioner of public safety shall establish 
standards for the administration and interpretation of 
chemical analysis of a personfs breath including 
standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material 
to prove that a person was driving or in actual physical 
control of a vehicle while under the influence of alco-
hol or driving with a blood alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of 
acts, conditions or events to prove that the analysis 
was made and the instrument used was accurate, according 
to standards established in subsection (1) shall be 
admissible if: 
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the 
regular course of the investigation at or about the 
time of the act, condition or event; and 
(b) The source of information frpm which made and 
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the method and the circumstances of their prepara-
tion were such as to indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established 
under subsection (1) and the conditions of subsection 
(2) have been met, there is a presumption that the test 
results are valid and further foundation for 
introduction of the evidence is unnessary. 
*Utah Code Section 77-7-15, passed in 1980, reads as 
follows: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
*Utah Code Sections 77-35-18(e)(4) & (14), otherwise known 
as Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, amended in 
1980, read as follows: 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a 
particular juror and may be taken on one or more of the 
following grounds: 
(4) The existence of any social, legal, business, 
fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective 
juror and any party, witness or person alleged to have 
been victimized or injured by the defendant, which rela-
tionship when viewed objectively , would suggest to 
reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be 
unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be 
free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be 
disqualified solely because he is indebted to or em-
ployed by the state or a political subdivision thereof 
(14) That a state of mind exists on the part of 
the juror with reference to the cause, or to either 
party, which will prevent him from acting impartially 
and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the 
party challenging . . . . 
Utah Rules of Evidence: 
*The Preliminary Note to the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
paragraph two, reads as follows: 
The Committee met . . . and recommended adoption 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence by the Supreme Court 
pursuant to the general judicial powers contained in the 
Constitution of Utah, Article VIII, Section 1 to super-
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vise inferior courts, and pursuant to the statutory 
rulemaking power of the Supreme Court contained in Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 78-2-4 (1953). It was the view 
of the Committee that, while the legislature may not 
enlarge judicial powers beyond those prescribed by the 
Constitution of Utah, Robinson v. Durand, 36 Utah 93, 
104 Pac. 760, (1908), the power to promulgate rules is 
within the general judicial powers conferred by Article 
VIII, Section 1. Any existing statutes inconsistent 
with these rules, if and when these ruj.es are adopted by 
the Supreme Court, will be impliedly repealed. 
*The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 101 of the Utah Ru 
of Evidence, paragraph three, reads as follows: 
The position of the court in State v. Hansen, 588 P.2d 
164 (Utah 1978) that statutory provisions of evidence 
law inconsistent with the rules will take precedence is 
rejected. 
*Rule 801 (a) ^ (c) of the Utah Rules of Evidence read 
follows: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or 
written assertion or (2)nonverbal conduct of a person, 
if it is intended by him as an assertion. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial 
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. 
*Rule 802 of the Utah Rules of Evidence reads as follows: 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or 
by these rules. 
*Rule 803 (6) ^ (8) of the Utah Rules of Evidence read 
follws: 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, 
even though the declarant is available as a witness. 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memo-
randum, report, record, or data compilation, in any 
form, or acts, events conditions, opinions or diagnoses, 
made at or near the time by, or from information trans-
mitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the 
course of a regularly conducted business activity, and 
if it was the regular practice of that business activity 
to make the memorandum, report, record or date compila-
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tion, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or 
other qualified witness, unless the source of informa-
tion or the method or circumstances of preparation indi-
cate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as 
used in the paragraph includes business, institution, 
association, profession, occupation, and calling of 
every kind, whether or not conducted for profit. 
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports 
statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public 
offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of 
the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant 
to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a 
duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases 
matters observed by police officers and other law 
enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and 
prceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, 
factual findings resulting from an investigation made 
puruant to authority granted by law, unless the sources 
of information or other circumstances indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
18 Utah Advance Reports 3, (1985) 
Pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 4, 
Constitution of Utah, as amended, the Court adopts all 
existing statutory rules of procedure and evidence not 
inconsistent with or superseded by rules of procedure 
and evidence heretofore adopted by this Court. 
Effective as of July 1, 1985. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CAS? 
This matter is an appeal from a criminal conviction and 
sentence for driving under the influence rendered in the Fourth 
Circuit Court, Davis County, Layton Department before a jury. 
The material facts of this case show that on August 6, 1986 
at the hour of 1:00 a.m., the appellant, Mr. Bennett, was pro-
ceeding northbound on Main Street in the City of Layton, Davis 
County, State of Utah. (Transcript of Trial, p. 44, lines 6-25). 
Upon arriving at 1100 N. Main, Mr. Bennett turned on his left 
blinker signal, turned into the left turn lane, and, after sit-
ting in the left turn lane for approximately 20 seconds, turned 
into a construction site where Mr. Bennett was the construction 
foreman. (Transcript of Trial, p.45, lines 1-9) There was no 
other traffic in the area excepting Officer Patterson of the 
Layton City Police Department who observed that Mr. Bennett 
undertook his proper left hand turn into the construction site 
without committing any traffic violations of any nature. 
(Transcript of Trial, p. 71, lines 15-17). 
There was nothing of value on the site which could be read-
ily removed (Transcript of Trial, p. 73, lines 14-18; Transcript 
of Suppression Hearing, p. 22, lines 23-25 and p. 23, lines 1-2), 
nor was the site posted with "no trespassing" signs (Transcript 
of Suppression Hearing, p. 23, lines 16-18). The area was not 
encircled with a fence (Transcript of Suppression Hearing, p. 21, 
lines 4-6) . There were no reports of burglaries at the site. 
(Transcript of Suppression Hearing, p. 24, lines 24-25; p. 25, 
line 1). 
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Officer Patterson did not observe Mr. Bennett undertake any 
criminal activity, nor did he suspect Mr- Bennett of criminal 
activity (Transcript of Trial, p. 74, lines 6-18). In spite 
of the utter lack of any reasonable suspicion that Mr. Bennett 
was engaged or had been engaged in any criminal activity, Officer 
Patterson turned into the construction site, activated his spot-
light, and directed the spotlight at Mr. Bennett, (Transcript of 
Trial, p. 47, lines 16-19). 
In response to the police spotlight, Mr. Bennett emerged 
from his vehicle, approached Officer Bennett, and asked the 
officer the nature of the problem. (Transcript of Trial, p 48, 
lines 1-19) The officer then noted the odor of alcoholic bev-
erages on the breath of Mr. Bennett, (Transcript of Trial, p. 49, 
lines 1-8) administered a series of field sobriety tests, (Trans-
cript of Trial, p. 50. lines 3-4) and later placed Mr. Bennett 
under arrest for "Driving Under the Influence." (Transcript of 
Trial, p. 58, lines 12-19). 
Mr. Bennett was subsequently administered an "Intoxilyzer" 
test, (Transcript of Trial, p. 86, lines 1-3) and evidence of the 
test result was admitted at trial over the objection of counsel. 
The objections were based on lack of foundation and hearsay. 
(Transcript of Trial, p. 91, lines 5-12; p. 92, lines 8-25, p. 
93, lines 1-17). 
In choosing the jury panel, counsel for Mr. Bennett objected 
to two of the jurors for cause. The Court denied the request, 
and counsel was forced to use two of his peremptory challenges on 
the two objectionable jurors. A specific outline of the pert-
inent facts of the jury selection process is provided: 
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a
* Mr. Hill: The first juror to whicih Mr. Bennett objected 
was a Mr. Hill who is a reserve police officer for Kaysville City 
and is qualified as a Category 2 police officer. (Transcript of 
trial, page 9, lines 1-6). He was familiar with two of the prose-
cution witnesses who are police officers with Layton City (Tran-
script of trial, page 6, line 25; page 7, lines 1-18). When Mr. 
Hill revealed that he was a part-time police officer, the Court 
inquired further concerning his attitudes, and asked: 
THE COURT: Okay. Would the fact that you had that 
police training give you a problem in being fair and 
impartial to both sides here? 
MR. HILL: I don't believe so. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Is there any other 
response? All right, we have none further. 
The Court made no further inquiries ihto Mr. Hill's ability 
to be impartial. Subsequently, before taking the opportunity to 
exercise peremptory challenges, appellant's attorney moved the 
Court to dismiss Mr. Hill for cause. The dialogue was as 
follows: 
MR. WANGSGARD: I might preface thi$, it is not my 
intention to embarrass anyone or otherwise discredit you 
in any form or fashion. I just believe that because of 
certain affiliations of certain of the jurors that it 
would be difficult to get a fair trial with respect to 
any one of these particular jurors. In particular, Mr. 
Hill as a Category 2 police officer. I believe that his 
position and the affiliation with a law enforcement 
agency would make it difficult an<fl I believe his 
responses to your questions has indicated that it would 
perhaps be best that he be excused for cause. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Mr. Garside. [The 
prosecutor] 
MR. GARSIDE: Your Honor, I think he has been quite 
candid and he says that he knows the officers, he hasn't 
worked with any of these officersK He's not a 
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departmental officer and has indicated he is a reserve 
officer as opposed to a full-time officer and I think 
that he has not shown any indications of prejudice one 
way or another. 
THE COURT: Thank you. In light of the statutory 
criteria by which we select jurors, in light of Mr. 
Hill's answers, the Court denies the challenge for 
cause. 
Therefore, the Court denied the challenge for cause 
regarding Mr. Hill, and Mr. Bennett was forced to use one of 
his peremptory challenges on Mr. Hill (R. p. 35). 
b. Mrs. Seamons; During voir dire, Mrs. Seamons asked how 
to tell the difference between a little drinking and no drinking 
(Transcript of Trial, p. 13, lines 7-9). The Court indicated that 
she would have to listen to the evidence and decide (Transcript 
of Trial, p. 13, lines 10-16) and Mrs. Seamons responded as 
follows: 
MRS. SEAMONS: Okay, that's why I would want to change 
the law to there could be no drinking because alcohol 
affects every person differently. 
THE COURT: All right. Let me ask you, if you were 
chosen as a juror in this case, could you apply the law 
as I have given it to you? Would you apply the law as I 
have given it to you? 
MRS. SEAMONS: I would try to. 
(Transcript of Trial, p. 13, lines 17-24) 
The Court asked a few other questions, and then asked if 
"anybody in your household, that is a member of MADD, RIDD, PADD, 
or any of those organizations similar to that, whose principal or 
sole objective is to remove drinking drivers from the highway? 
Mrs. Seamons? (Transcript of Trial, p. 14, lines 24-25; p. 15, 
lines 1-3). Mrs. Seamons responded that she was a member of 
MADD, and the Court queried as follows: 
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THE COURT: All right. Considering yoqr membership, and 
I assume support with time and effort and so forth in 
that organization, if you were chosen as a juror, would 
you be able to be fair and objective in weighing the 
testimony and be indifferent to other considerations, 
your general view about drinking and driving, relative 
to Mr. Bennett? Could you be fair and objective with 
him? 
MRS. SEAMONS: I think so. 
(Transcript of Trial, p. 15, lines 5-]j3) 
The Court inquired no further on the ability of Mrs. Seamons 
to be impartial in her judgment of Mr. Bennett, and did not 
inquire any further concerning the extent of her involvement in 
MADD or the strength of her committment to MADD and its principles. 
Counsel for appellant later asked the Court to excuse Mrs. 
Seamons for cause: 
MR. WANGSGARD: Additionally, Your Honor, we would 
challenge Mrs. Seamons for cause. She has indicated 
that she doesn't believe that it's correct for anyone to 
have anything to drink and drive at all. She is a 
member of MADD. We believe that she should properly be 
excused for cause. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. Do you want to 
respond, Mr. Garside? 
MR. GARSIDE: Your honor, in light of that I think that 
even though she said that she — that that is her 
opinion and that she is affiliated with that association 
that indeed she would follow the laws instructed by the 
Court and I think thatfs the primary criteria in 
consideration here. 
THE COURT: Thank you. In light of her responses to the 
Court's questions upon explanation of the issues and Mr. 
Bennett's position before the Court, the Court denies 
that challenge for cause. 
(Transcript of Trial, p. 32, lines 7-23) 
Again, the Court denied appellant'^ counsel's motion to 
dismiss a juror for cause based upon the slight examination of 
the juror. Mrs. Seamons was later dismissed from the panel by 
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appellant's counsel with one of his remaining peremptory 
challenges (R. p. 35)• 
The appellant used all of his peremptory challenges in 
choosing the jury panelf two of which challenges were for Mr. 
Hill and Mrs. Seamons. (R. p. 35) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. The trial court below improperly denied the Motion of. 
Mr. Bennett to suppress the evidence gathered by the law 
enforcement officers on the grounds that the Layton City police 
had no reasonable suspicion of the commission of any criminal 
acts by Mr. Bennett. Mr. Bennett did not perform any acts in the 
presence of the officer which gave grounds for the officer to 
stop Mr. Bennett and investigate his persoh. 
B. During examination of the jury panel, it was discovered 
that two of the jurors should have been dismissed for cause. The 
Court refused to dismiss the jurors for cause, thus forcing Mr. 
Bennett to use two of his peremptory challenges on the two 
suspect jurors. The refusal of the Court to dismiss the jurors 
for cause was prejudicial to the interests of Mr. Bennett. 
C. The evidence submitted by the prosecution and accepted 
by the Court over the objections of Mr. Bennett was hearsay 
evidence which did not come within the exceptions to the hearsay 
rule contained within Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Because the evidence was hearsay evidence and should 
have been rejected by the Court, there was no proper foundation 
for the testimony elicited with respect to Mr. Bennett's 
performance on the blood alcohol level tes^. 
17 
ARGUMENT 
A. Should the Evidence Obtained by the Layton Police 
Incident to the Stop and Subsequent Search and Seizure of Mr, 
Bennett Have Been Suppressed by the Court Below? 
1. RECITATION OF THE APPLICABLE FACTS: 
At the hearing on Mr. Bennett's Motion to Suppress held by 
the Court on October 30, 1986 prior to trial of this matter, the 
Court heard testimony from the City of Layton concerning the 
"reasonable suspicion" which the police authorities had to stop, 
search and seize the appellant, Mr. Bennett, in this action. At 
the hearing, testimony was elicited from Officer David Patterson 
of the Layton Police Department that he was on patrol in the 
early morning of August 6, 1986 within the city limits of Layton, 
Utah. 
Officer Patterson testified that he observed Mr. Bennett's 
vehicle stopped in the left hand turn lane, with its left blinker 
signaling. (Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Suppress, p. 8, 
lines 12-18) Although there was no other traffic on the street, 
Mr. Bennett stayed in the left hand turn lane for approximately 
20 seconds before turning into a construction site. (Transcript 
of Hearing on Motion to Suppress, p. 9, lines 13-15) The Officer 
did not observe any traffic violation, nor did he observe any 
criminal activity. (Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Suppress, 
p. 27, lines 9-12) Upon observing Mr. Bennett turn into the 
construction site, Officer Patterson turned into the vacant con-
struction site, pulled within four car lengths of Mr. Bennett's 
vehicle, and directed his spotlight onto Mr. Bennett. (Transcript 
of Hearing on Motion to Suppress, p. 15, lines 2-9). There was 
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nothing of value on the site which coulcj be readily removed 
(Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Suppress, p. 22, lines 8-11, 
19-21, 23-25; p. 23, lines 1-2), and there was no gate or fencing 
or posting against trespassing (Transcript of Hearing on Motion 
to Suppress, p. 21, lines 4-6, p. 23, lines 15-21). 
Mr. Bennett then exited his vehicle, approached the officer, 
and asked "What is the problem?" (Transcript of Hearing on Motion 
to Suppress, p. 16, lines 19-20) at which point Officer Patterson 
testifies that he noticed the odor of alcfohol on the breath of 
Mr. Bennett. (Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Suppress, p. 18, 
lines 11-14). 
On cross-examination, Officer Patterson testified that he 
had not observed Mr. Bennett engaged in any criminal activity: 
Q: (By Mr. Wangsgard) Had you observed Mr. Bennett 
engage in any criminal activity prior to the time you 
turned on your spotlight? 
A: No. 
. . . . 
Q: Did you have a reason—okay, you had a hunch, you had 
a suspicion something might be afoot. 
A: Yes. 
Q: But nothing you can really pin it to|? 
A: No, just suspicion. 
Q: Okay. Would it be fair to characterize that 
suspicion as a hunch? 
A: Not a hunch, no. 
Q: A gut feeling? 
A: A hunch or a gut feeling is more than a suspicion. 
Q: Is more than a suspicion? So it didn't rise to the 
level of a hunch in your estimation, or a gut feeling? 
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A: Not at that point, it was just a suspicion. 
(Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Suppress, p. 27, lines 9-12, 
p. 28, lines 1-14). 
Therefore, in summary, Officer Patterson failed to state any 
reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity on the part 
of Mr. Bennett, and indeed did not have even a "hunch" or a "gut 
feeling" that any criminal activity was being undertaken or had 
been undertaken by Mr. Bennett at the time that Officer Patterson 
stopped his patrol car within four car lengths of Mr. Bennett's 
vehicle and directed his spotlight in the direction of Mr. 
Bennett's vehicle. 
2. ARGUMENT: 
a. Controlling Decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court: 
i. Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1967). 
As the parent of numerous interpretive offspring by later 
Justices of the United States Supreme Court, Terry, Id. 
stands for the proposition that the rights granted in the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, i.e., 
[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . . 
Article Four, United States Constitution. 
shall not be violated. 
The facts of Terry concerned a police officer who observed 
two men walk past and peer into a store window on approximately 
24 different occasions over a period a few hours, interspersed 
with furtive conversations with a third person. Thereafter, with 
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his suspicion of criminal activity reasonably aroused, the offi-
cer questioned the individuals, received illogical responses, and 
feeling threatened for his safety, searched the men and dis-
covered concealed weapons on their persons. They were subse-
quently arrested and convicted of possessing concealed weapons. 
Before discussing the particulars of the case, the Court 
discussed the need for enforcement of the Fourth Amendment, and 
stressed that the Fourth Amendment is the private citizen's 
protection from "lawless police conduct" T^rry, supra at 12 and 
that of the Fourth Amendment, 
[E]xperience has taught that it [The F|ourth Amendment] 
is the only effective deterrent to police misconduct in 
the criminal context, and that without it the constitu-
tional guarantee against unreasonable searches and 
seizures would be a mere form of words. 
. * . c 
A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial, we 
recognize, has the necessary effect of legitimizing the 
conduct which produced the evidence, while an 
application of the exclusionary rule withholds the 
constitutional imprimatur. I_d. at 12, 13. 
The Court recognized that a police officer, on the beat, 
does not necessarily have the time or the prediliction to analyze 
whether he is affecting the constitutional imprimatur, but that 
the police officer must be aware that whenever a police officer 
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to move away, he 
has "seized" that person and that such seizure may be a violation 
of the individual's rights under the Fourth Amendment. 
Answering a query regarding the limitations of an officer in 
accosting an individual, the Court established a standard against 
which the police officer must measure his activities: 
[B]alancing the need to search [or seize] against the 
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invasion which the search [or seizure] entails," [citing 
Camara v. Municipal Court 387 U.S. 523, 534-535, 536-
537, (1967)] And in justifying the particular intrusion 
the police officer must be able to point to specific 
and articulable facts which, taken together with ra-
tional inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant 
that intrusion, (emphasis added). 
This demand for specificity in the information upon 
which police action is predicated is the central 
teaching of this Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
Terry, supra at 21. 
Stated in a different fashion, the Court reiterated the above 
declaration and stated: 
[I]n making that assessment [the reasonableness of the 
search or seizure] it is imperative that the facts be 
judged against an objective standard: would the facts 
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or 
the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief" that the action taken was appropriate? . . . . 
Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitu-
tionally guaranteed
 # rights based on nothing more sub-
stantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court 
has consistently refused to sanction. Id at 22. 
In spite of the ruling by the Supreme Court in Terry that a 
search or seizure must be more than inarticulate hunches, the 
Court below ignored the Terry standard and allowed the admission 
of evidence gathered by an officer who admittedly did not have 
even a "hunch" or a "gut feeling" of criminal activity prior to 
the seizure of Mr. Bennett. By his own admission, the officer did 
not observe Mr. Bennett engaged in any criminal activity and 
certainly could not and did not recite any "specific and arti-
culable facts" stated with "specificity" which warranted the 
officer's intrusion upon Mr. Bennett's person. The officer, in 
fact, stated his reason for stopping Mr. Bennett did not even 
rise to the level of an "inarticulate hunch." 
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W i t \.
 # j T X a^ I 
Anotner landmar/. oast- ;r • ne c m t m , ;\ : analysis of Fourth 
AmendmenL i. :*" -i^r^I ' ' "iffieers who " M-TP 
cruisirg th° :-,iect.s of E. :- a> * Texas :n a:: area known for i t.s 
druo *-raff:~. *r'-^  tfi^pr? ohsprvp^i * ^ o mem walking away from 
ea< , s* dted the situation 
"IcoKeo sijsricioi;.:/' hj f c, -i :. * h- , : stars^ aei~:c: 
cl-'^ lu aurr^^t Bruwn of *-« 
t M * ^:own wa'. , an = r^ =a A.* ig. 11^ .vience >^; ^tuo - - c r - <. * 
The Couit declared th^r in - -* r £ ^ ^ ^ S L ^ K ~y ^ ^ 
[W]e [the Supreme Court] nave rpqiired 'he officers * 
have a reasonable suspicionf based on objective facts, 
that the individual is involved in criminal *r*. r rv, 
The flaw in the State's case i s that none cf the 
circumstances preceding the officers 1 detention of the 
•appell ant justified a reasonable suspi cion that no was 
i nvolved in criminal conduct. , . . The fact t^a1 the 
appellant . was in a neighborhood frequented by drug, 
users,. standing alone, is not a basis for concluding 
that the apoellant himself was engaged in criminal con-
duct. Brown, supra a t 5 i « 
An officer cannot arb i *~ rar i 1 y •." tc i: a --dividua * w , rhout 
some reasonable susririo- j *e 
I rid i :i dual i s 'jnqaqet. . :. : , ;n . n^ ; ac* i
 v , t y. 
The mere fact that Officer Pattprson observed - -.z&r.n&i - •n 
. in r i r *--M (r i [ 1 I* 11 i 'i > in i : '- ' *-'* I '" - »" - -r f 
d o e : - iit.-t. c i v * - i , *>*-> r - ^'asonar le suspicic -;ased or bjective 
f ac" - . +• ha - ^ . .-^np^* *-
 WH-" enqaqed i •* 
" - - . * -r-~cr; .... . , r.estnie.. f.,.^ t he ;; < .- 'rjv^ any 
reasonable suspicion 'r.-i? v'i. Bennett was engagea 01 had engaged 
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in criminal activity, and certainly had observed no supporting 
facts. The unavoidable conclusion is that the stop seizure by 
Officer Patterson was impermissible and any evidence garnered as 
a result of that stop must be suppressed. 
b. Controlling Decisions of the Utah Supreme Court: 
The Utah Supreme Court has recently reviewed a number of 
situations involving United States Constitutional Fourth Amend-
ment rights, Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14 rights and 
Utah Code Section 77-7-15. In each instance, the Utah Supreme 
Court has closely followed the guidelines set out by the United 
States Supreme Court in the decisions above. 
i. State v. Swanigan 699 P.2d 718 (1985). 
Two police officers investigated a report of a burglary. 
While enroute to investigate, they noticed the appellant and 
another person walking along the road approximately a block from 
the buglarized residence. The officers reported to dispatch an 
"attempt to locate" the two individuals. Two hours later, a 
third officer located the two persons approximately three blocks 
from the buglarized residence, stopped the two individuals, and 
asked for identification. After checking for outstanding war-
rants, the police officer discovered there was an outstanding 
traffic warrant on the appellant, and arrested the appellant. In 
searching the appellant after the arrest, certain items taken 
from the buglarized home were found. 
The appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence as 
being gathered in violation of his Fourth amendment rights and 
the trial court denied the motion. 
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T1 i e I11: a il: I S i i p r e in e C o i i :i : t: r e l : r e r s e d 11 i e - . • •• v : <=• - *- ' • -: * * ; c u o n u i 
a p p e 11 a n t, s t a t i n g: 
i , brief investigatory stop of an i ndividual by police 
officers is permissible when the officers "have a rea-
sonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the 
individual is involved in criminal activity." 
[T]he officer who stopped defendant and his companion 
lacked a reasonable suspicion to believe they had en-
gaged in criminal conduct. The stop was based solely on 
a description by a fellow officer who had observed the 
I :wo walking along the street at a late hour in an area 
where recent burglaries had been reported. Neither 
officer had any knowledge that defendant and his com-
panion had been at the scene of the crime. The officers 
had not observed the men engaged in any unlawful or 
suspicious activity. On the facts presented, the stop 
was based on a mere hunch rather that the constitution-
ally mandated "reasonable suspicion"; consequently, the 
confiscated evidence was erroneously admitted at trial. 
Supra. 
Swar:: T*:. I S s t d i t u - - -* ' •* " - ~~- a t o a r , JJUL e v e i i 
more similar is State v.Carpena - ^ ) . 
1
 i • State v.Carpena 7 ] 4 T^ . :- •* ; -^  > • . 
plates ir - neighborhood where recent reports r-c~,<: n^e*. received 
of " " 3 ? ^ ~ *' -•.--,-. ,1M . - ir w a s ir • ' " ^ w ' •  ^ r ^ ' n ^ " " 1 T r'" e 
neu;xc:..L- : , .. ^.r.j the c. : . ".:: ^ . : . 
officer turned on h s red liohts, at . *- • y;- ] : e c:~- • jrned a 
i'ei'fk. V c c i t,.i'/r- r\ e / ^  1 . 1 ; i t; i'it- .; gn i * ion, a- : «..perie»'-t •,-'.- * j ^  •. • ' •. «d 
thirtv pounds of ma:' •iana. 
press the evidence, base-- » r .e ru ; ; ru : ->f Brown_ Y^JTexajs, supra 
dIi
'* ^ i L ^ 6 ^ * .:.*/ar,:gtir. •„{ - „ un ir* 'ne litan Supreme Court-
stated: 
The stop was based merely on the fact that a car with 
out-of-state 1icense plates was mo\ i ng slowly through a 
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neighborhood late at night. The officer had no objec-
tive facts on which to base a reasonable suspicion that 
the men were involved in criminal activity. The ruling 
of the district court is affirmed. Carpena, supra at 
675. 
Again, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed that before an offi-
cer is allowed to stop any person, the officer must have a rea-
sonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the person is 
involved in criminal activity. 
iii. State v. Constantino 732 P.2d 125 (1987). 
In this recent Utah case, the appellant was observed by a 
police officer driving a car on the public roads. The officer 
had personal knowledge that appellant's drivers license was sus-
pended and also recognized the passenger from an arrest warrant 
of which the officer had personal knowledge. Taking these facts 
into consideration, the officer stopped the automobile, arrested 
appellant, and impounded the automobile. During an inventory 
search of the automobile the officer found marijuana in the 
trunk, and the appellant was charged with possession of a con-
trolled substance. 
The appellant moved to suppress the evidence. The district 
court denied the motion. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that the police officer did have an articulable, reason-
able suspicion of criminal activity, and that the stop by the 
officer was appropriate due to his knowledge of appellant's 
suspended driver's license and the outstanding warrant. 
In the matter at bar, Officer Patterson claimed no such 
knowledge at.the time of the seizure of Mr. Bennett. 
c. Statutory Provisions of the Utah Code: 
The constitutional protections afforded individuals from 
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;;P.T ^ dscnsb 1 ^  s°a r'^ h^ ^ a r•"^  a° i ?ur^s ^ e r? 1 Ja r "* n *~Qdd " ^* * r x';rt h 
Sect] en „- : the U'-ah 'Constitution ha* *-> be' n recoqnized bv the 
L-T" =lature of Utan -jnd ~~d t . • 
follows: 
2 peace officer may stop any person in a pu.blic place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is 
attempting to commit a publi c offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
Thus, the legislature has rxplicitedly recognized *:./>»• oeace 
officers are -- *
 j 
a
 "
rQasona; <- oUopi. :wi-' * • .. :•- commission - . a i-jfii^  offense. 
Officer Patterson clear ly stated that • ... - • * ••-1v^  -  r ^ c o ^ ~ 
for---, tne sr.op and seizure of xr. L^nrett was clearly . J rela-
tion of his statutory and Constitutional r:r ! 
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B. Did the Court Improperly Deny Mr. Bennett's Request to 
Dismiss Two of the Jurors for Cause? 
1. FACTUAL BACKGROUND: 
During voir dire of the jury panel, Mr. Bennett requested 
the Court to dismiss two jurors for cause. The Court refused to 
dismiss either of the two persons, and Mr. Bennett therefore used 
two of his peremptory challenges to exclude the two persons from 
the jury. 
As is more fully set out in the Statement of the Case, 
adequate proof of the potential bias of the two jurors was 
present. The two jurors should have been dismissed for cause. 
Mr. Hill is a category two police officer who knew two of the 
City!s witnesses, and, by judicial decree, is presumed to impli-
citly trust the statements of other peace officers. Mrs. Seamons 
is a member of MADD, or, Mothers Against Drunken Driving, who 
stated that she did not believe any person should be allowed to 
consume alcoholic beverages, and did not further qualify her 
blanket statement against the use of alcoholic beverages. 
2. ARGUMENT: 
In the Utah case of State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 
(1980) , the Utah Supreme Court was faced with an appeal of a 
criminal matter where two jurors were not dismissed for cause as 
in the instant matter, forcing the appellant to use two of his 
peremptory challenges. In discussing the matter, the Utah 
Supreme Court quotes favorably from the case of Reynolds v. U.S. 
98 U.S. 145 (1978) as follows: 
The United States Supreme Court, considering this 
subject in Reynolds v. U.S. . . . stated that "The 
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t h e o r y o £ t h e 1 a w I s 1I i a t a j u r o i: w 1: 1 o h a s f o r m e d a. n 
opinion cannot be impartial..11 Id. a t: 155. Chief Justice 
Marsha11, presiding over the tria1 of Aaron Burr I n 
1807, defined an impartial jury as one composed of 
persons who "will fairly hear the testimony which may be 
offered to them, and bring in their verdict, according 
to that testimony, and according to the law arising on 
it." Burrf s Trial p. 415. Marshall's test for 
impartiality, quoted with approval j n Reynolds, is: 
[ L ] i g 1 I t i rn pressions wh i c t i in a y f a I r 1 y b e s u p p o s e d t • :: 
yield to the testimony that may be offered; which may 
leave the mi nd open to a fair consideration of that 
testimony, constitute no sufficient objection to a 
juror; but that those strong and deep impressions whi ch 
will close the mind against the testimony that may be 
offered in opposition to them; which will combat that 
testimony and resist its force, do constitute a suffi-
cient objection t o him. Id at 4] 6. 
State v. BajJ^ey, supra at 76 7. 
rt
*<- l^r-^'ed States Supreme .„.,i* recoqr^;.:-- < __ .- . 
an impartial iur^ * is ^:&\ mat4 -r where . * -y ;c -^quested. 
determine wrer i i.ror ^  ;n>pr essi-*r ^  i .. : re judiCes a:*- ^*ro;ig 
aiiu d^or enough f - * " ! ^ s & ^ ^ ^ y r* a o ^ i r - ^ * ~ . - t-estjmnpv w h i c h ^ a v 
b e o: i - . x : •. . ' t - -.-
dice?- >u; r an m ^ t overcome- *• : c * hFi prejudice 
••"""- • . *. jje dismissed, or the 
case -us- » -: ir-tixe*.
 t .. -*!'/• 
^ f.iv r.dik a-; *,94 • rtd' S- preme r'ourj addr^ss^d the 
-'- case c: State v. Chea1y, >- ) c ' .-4* Wher askca 
aii, " * J--1. -r" ^ejudi ce against- a man making « i i x ^ , 
questional. -, . answered i 
I would if an automobile accident was involved, that was 
relating in any way to an automobile accident, I would 
be very strong against it, not on religious grounds, 
Id. at 3 78. 
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Further questioning by the Court elicited a reply from the juror 
that the juror would not be prejudiced against the Defendant 
notwithstanding his previous reply. The trial Court did not 
allow a challenge for cause, and the Defendant appealed. 
The Utah Supreme Court agreed with the appellant that the 
challenge for cause should have been granted, stating that the 
juror's state of mind indicated that the juror could not act with 
entire impartiality in the matter. However, the Court ruled that 
the error in refusing to sustain the challenge for cause was not 
prejudicial because there was no evidence in the record that the 
appellant used all of his peremptory challenges. 
In 1977, the Court again addressed the issue of a challenge 
to a juror for cause in the matter of State v. Moore 562 P.2d 629 
(1977) where a member of the panel repeatedly stated that he did 
not know if could honestly be fair in a case involving the sale 
of narcotics. The appellantfs attorney then asked the Court to 
dismiss the juror for cause. 
In spite of the obvious prejudice of the juror, the trial 
court did not excuse the juror for cause. The appellant then 
exercised a peremptory challenge on the juror. The appellant 
subsequently used all of his peremptory challenges. 
On appeal, the Court stated: 
The defendant was required to exercise one of his 
peremptory challenges to challenge a juror who clearly 
stated he was not sure he could be impartial and 
unbiased in deciding the case. The failure of the trial 
court to excuse the juror Rock for actual bias as that 
term is defined in [the predecessor statute to 77-35-18] 
was prejudicial and in effect it deprived defendant of 
one of his statutory peremptory challenges in that he 
was required to exercise one of the peremptory 
challenges to have Rock excused from serving on the 
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jury. 
The trial court erred in refusing to excuse 1 Ir Rock 
upon challenge being made by defendant's attorney i n 
accordance with statute and it appeari ng clearly that 
Mr. Rock was actually biased, as that term is defined in 
our statute. Supra. at 8 31 
T h e ^^1^+- f .- .n^d *--.^f +> o - . -
 a i c o U i i ' s e r r o r was f a t a l , a n d 
r en tai ided - . 1 -
T h i i -;e (. f r - a s o r i ] n q f h a f i * ; s p r e j u d i c i a l e r r ; ! f^r f r e 
t r i v f - * 
remt . c j u i v , . . - win, S. U . a - :, - i r e m o v e d f i r c a u s e >? a p p u i t e d 
i n ~ - ^ :*t^h c a s e s f o l J ^ i n a M o o r e , v x i \ S e e ^ - r a t** 
B a r J c_v J e n k i n s ? '_. r a i r i b 
( ; 9 P : ) * S j^a t e y^ L a c e y 6^5 P,J- 1 "> * " • 98 .3 ) :
 3nd S t a t e v . H e w i t t 
689 P . : ^ ( 1 9 8 4 ) . - ::ewjL_tj •-<•• • , - - ~ - a - • 
t h e d e i e n c a n t a p p e a l e r ; •:,•:- f h - i - :. , *, , r u i ,- sr . - , 
b e e n e x c u s e d f o r c a u s e . 
bee"" r x c i i £ p : f m r a u s e wai *'• H . i : a . • w a d m i t t e d + -
t r a " r ; i r a *~ * - i b u ^ ^ w h : l o n? : v in f . ' * ' i n t A ^ v , -^d + v . • •-- v - ^ d 
nur-'-: , - r : . . • I . : . . .-TP . . . . . -, •« a « , »,,; t 
knov any of * ne prospective witnesses r\ * ^.\ matter.. Holli day 
did st:""- that he couiu a< • - : .i4 \- e in at I: .er. 
T;,t Jourt stated: 
-.tate^ent mad:> r;y a prospective *urcr 'hat *~e irtpnds 
•o be fair and impartial loses its meaning I; .:x1-J 
other testimony or facts that suggest a bias. Ji 
26. remnhas^s add^d 1. 
Tf le . ;c-c: - .. .... : „nd, but 
t h e s e c o n d - i u r ^ r wa:- i r . a b l e t , ; c l e a r l ' s t a t e t h a * r.e .* i u l d n o t 
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favor the police over the defendant. Therefore, the Court found 
that the second juror had such 
[S]trong and deep impressions with regard to the vera-
city of police officer's testimony [that he] would 
credit a police officer's testimony to an undue extent. 
He should have been dismissed for cause. Therefore, 
forcing defendants to use one of their peremptory chal-
lenges to remove [the juror] resulted in prejudicial 
error. Supra, at 27. 
Just as the second juror was dismissed for cause in the 
Hewitt case because he was of the temperment to give the police 
officer's testimony undue weight, so should Mr. Hill have been 
dismissed from the jury panel for cause because of his natural 
inclination to give a fellow police officer's testimony undue 
weight. The Utah case of State v. Nielson, 727 P.2d 188, (1986) 
concerned the validity of a search warrant based on the false 
information provided by a police officer to the magistrate. The 
State, arguing in support of the search warrant, reasoned that 
"warrants may be issued upon even the 'double hearsay1 between 
police officers under the general rule that law enforcement 
officers are presumed to tell each other the truth. . . . " 1A. at 
191. The Court agreed with the State's reasoning, and stated: 
"there is a presumption that law enforcement officers will convey 
information to each other truthfully." j[_d. at 192. 
If law enforcement officers are presumed to tell each other 
the truth, then Mr. Hill certainly could not be objective in his 
evaluation of the testimony of Officer Patterson, for the pre-
sumption by Mr. Hill, a law enforcement officer, is that Officer 
Patterson tells the truth. 
Applying the above cases to the instant matter, it is clear 
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that the predispositions of both Mr. : — • -1rs. Seamons were 
tainted \)\ 'strong and deep impressi. . ._ -^  ext^r>+- fl^at 
neither Mr. Hill nor Mrs. Seamons v.cr u < * ^  <. ff>: ( * -lear 
a n d 11 n t a i n t ^ d m i n d !"••»< 11 e c e s s a r y r i»r 1 
admitted he actually knew at least t1^ * trie witnesses, ana was 
= p o 1 i c e of f i c e r h i m. s e 1 f w h o p r e s u ^  <^  ? * *- a +- "^ ; ^ +• h e r off i^^rs 
te 11 11 ie 1: r i 11 1 M3 : = ; Seai i ioi: Is was a n i• \ > ^cronyr u r 
Motr.-i s Aoams^ Trui k ;,riv.no, and stated that she was for the 
passac* • - . - ' . - --» ag€ * - f 
the above ..crouiia ci.tM., a\>? oeen dismissed oy * :;e O-ui' nor 
'-'3vi-<^9 Therefor*3 v,> ^ n n e t ^ had * vastp'1 f v * '+" ^  ^  •- ^ ^ > t ^ r -
: - , ; , - .. . 11 
e r r o r . 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS: 
;..:••:an Code Section 77-35-18, Utah. Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, Rule 18, states the rules1 for the selection f * :rv n a 
i + , i 
:nalienge foi cause re be presented t .- •--.^  "curt, 3nr; I-*4P !c>.:th 
section states ac *•-.*** »i.,.^  
\*) The e^icifixe of any socia1 f 1ega1, busI ness, 
fiduciary or other relationship between the pr ospective 
juror and a n y party, w it ness or p ers on a11e ged t o h ave 
been victimized or injured by the defendant, which rela-
tionship when viewed objectively, would suggest to rea-
sonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable 
or unwilling to return a verdict wh ich would be free of 
favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disquali-
fied solely because he is indebted to or employed by the 
state or a po1itical subdivi sion thereof; 
The f ou r *- ^  ° n f " ~ ° ^  +• •> o n s t a t e s i 
(14 _ a state of mind exists on the part of the 
juror A. •• reference to the cause, or to either party, 
which w:.. orevent him from acting impartially and 
without nre;udi ce to the substantial rights of - he party 
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challenging . . . . 
Without question, Mr. Bennett was entitled to exclude, for 
cause, both Mr. Hill and Mrs. Seamons on the basis of the above 
statute and the heavy weight of authority supporting this point. 
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C. Should M-• evidence concern inq *he result.- of the 
11
 intoxi 1 yz** - n tiest '~o ^  • i ,a 1 ,i n I 
subsequenti> iiabmitted to the jury? 
1 FACTUAL BACKGROUND: 
During *:he course or irv- ;ri^~ he prosecution introduced 
e v ~* d o n'"" ° "• ^  t *""":,o ^" —rtv' '" *" T~* ^ l !'"" s ' J! 
esr.aL .:,z:^;. .: : o o ^ . . :oc a l ^ o - w j Le:-. .ci<. ; ^er. raopanistered to 
F r < B e n n e t t 'Exhibit V , that' ' "~- e d e v i c ^  f o r m e a s n r "i n o *- ^  o v- " ^ o d 
s " : i • • - H - ^ : ; - : • - - ' - • - : m 
transcript;? ^ x h i r . t t r,ai f rie t^ ojt was properly adm „ oistered 
(Exhibit A and Transcr : r*" ^f 7'^  ' Nowl lere 
•:--i^ an explanation o,; tn<_ i u r v .e-aiomo the uiup^i I nter-
pretaticn of Exhibit B. 
\. *- ™* 
troduCTiuii , ,r i e v i d e n c e .-n t h e has;: : < ; h e a r s a y o r ^ . : of 
f o U n d a t i ^ T r T r a n Q r - n r-+ r. f T v . - ^ :Q * - - - * ~ ,
 f 
"1 0 ;
 f . .^PS i ; - ! ^ l i e s l o 2 o ^':d l 1 ]r>-^ > 
1 4 | tuc L l i d i UUUJ ' ' ' ! d 
t h e q u e s t i o n a b l e p \ i . . c rv» t . t - i d n i t t e c oi. : t h e r e f o r e j - i ibmj t ted 
t o t h e j u r y . 
ARGUMENT: 
The- Kvidence Admitted Over ^b}ection Did Not Conform to 
the n+ ah Ru * e^ - f -' - •* 
.. . . . / .donee were adopted by ^ he Utah 
Supr^rre Co'->fc -r April " , ; « <, j__i ;,ere considered effective 
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September 1, 1983. The Preliminary Note to the Rules of Evidence 
indicate that "any existing statutes inconsistent with these 
rules, if and when these rules are adopted by the Supreme Court, 
will be impliedly repealed." (Preliminary Note to Utah Rules of 
Evidence). 
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 101, entitled "Scope" 
state in the last paragraph that "[t]he position of the court in 
State v. Hansen, 588 P.2d 164 (1978) that statutory provisions of 
evidence law inconsistent with the rules will take precedence is 
rejected." (Advisory Notes to Rule 101, Utah Rules of Evidence). 
In addition, 18 Utah Advance Reports 3 states: 
Pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII, Section 4, 
Constitution of Utah, as amended, the Court adopts all 
existing statutory rules of procedure and evidence not 
inconsistent with or superseded by rules of procedure 
and evidence heretofore adopted by this Court. 
Effective as of July 1, 1985. 
Contrary to the Utah Rules of Evidence, Utah Code 
Section 41-6-44.3 states: 
(1) The commissioner of public safety shall establish 
standards for the administration and interpretation of 
chemical analysis of a person's breath including 
standards of training. 
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material 
to prove that a person was driving or in actual physical 
control of a vehicle while under the influence of alco-
hol or driving with a blood alcohol content statutorily 
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of 
acts, conditions or events to prove that the analysis 
was made and the instrument used was accurate, according 
to standards established in subsection (1) shall be 
admissible if: 
(a) The judge finds that they were made in the 
regular course of the investigation at or about the 
time of the act, condition or event; and 
(b) The source of information from which made and 
the method and the circumstances of their prepara-
tion were such as to indicate their trustworthiness. 
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established 
under subsection (1) and the conditions of subsection 
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(2) have been met, there is a presumption that the :- :..t 
results are valid and further foundati on r 
introduction of the evidence is unnessary 
Pule 8C! /c> :-f 4 b- V1 ^\ F";1es of Evidence states: 
(c) Hearsay "Hearsay" is a statement, c tvt- \ *)•-::- one 
made by the declarant whi le testifying at the Z L \ 3 \ or 
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. 
t 
hearsay i» ,OL ddmib^r, n- except when otherwise excepts 
immediate 1^ +z^ 1 1 "-^  ' ' :* i ° P n l co* s f'"* * h i i' *-> ^xc^ n^ -j^ nc +-,- * • ^  
:.'.jc: .-. J , .: - , _ ' . J S 
ma 11 e r . 
regular coui^e ui ouhiness ctn- ,i\ exi tp! iuri * ? :u- : ear^ctv i-.ie, 
but t h af r " -s r u s t «">n i -n n of thp records mu s f tes^ if^? ' •; * ' 3 
the --uston c~ t: e easiness f s^ kee; F-.T r*--"orj;-. 
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operation and calibration of the device was not present, but 
instead an affidavit under Utah Code 41-6-44.3(b) was admitted to 
show that the device was accurate. 
The fallacy with the use of an affidavit under Section 41-6-
44.3(b) is that such section authorizes the use of hearsay evi-
dence, i.e., documents offered as memoranda or records of acts to 
prove the analysis was made and the instrument was accurate. The 
Utah Rules of Evidence do not contain any such exception for the 
use of any such document or affidavit to overcome the hearsay 
rule. 
The two possible exceptions to the hearsay rule in the 
instant matter listed under Rule 803 are: subsection 6-allows a 
record of a regularly conducted activity to be admitted if the 
custodian of the records testifies of the record's accuracy; and, 
subsection 8-allows a public record to be admitted only if the 
public record does not involve a criminal case where there has 
been an observation by a law enforcement officer. 
In this matter, there was no custodian to lay a foundation 
for the admissibility of the questioned exhibits, thus elimin-
ating the possibility of admission under 803(6). And since law 
enforcement officers witnessed the calibration and operation of 
the device in question, it was necessary for the officers to be 
present to testify concerning the calibration and operation of 
the device, but no such officers were present, eliminating the 
exception provided by 803 (8). 
Absolutely no exception to the hearsay rule exists allowing 
the proposed affidavits to be admitted into evidence without 
either the custodian of the records or the actual officer admin-
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istering the calibration of the machine to testify. However, 
the court below disregarded the Utah Rules of Evidence, and chose 
to admit the questioned exhibits into evidence under the aegis of 
a statute (Utah Code 41-6-44.3) , which Statute should not be 
considered in light of the advisory notes to the Rules of Evi-
dence, supra given the fact that the statute has been impliedly 
repealed by Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution as 
interpreted by the advisory notes and the per curium opinion of 
18 UAR 3. The statute is patently contrary to the Rules of 
Evidence as adopted by the Utah Supreme Court. 
Such improper admission of the questioned exhibits was 
clearly prejudicial to the interests of Mr. Bennett. If the 
exhibits had not been introduced into evidence, no evidence would 
have been presented regarding the results of the intoxilyzer 
device. 
The introduction of the questioned evidence was clearly 
prejudicial, and the matter should be dismissed, or remanded for 
a new trial on such basis. 
b. If the Court Finds Some Exception to the Hearsay Rule 
Applicable to the Questioned Exhibits, the Exhibits Must Nonethe-
less Conform to the Requirements of Utah Code Section 41-6-44.3 
as Interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court in Murray v. Hall 
In April of 1983, (prior to the adoption by the Utah Supreme 
Court of the Utah Rules of Evidence) the Utah Supreme Court 
handed down the case of Murray v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, which 
holds that in order to admit the affidavit referred to in Utah 
Code 41-6-44.3, the affidavit had to reflect certain statements, 
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including an affirmative showing that the calibration and testing 
for accuracy of the device for measuring the alcohol content of 
an individual was performed in accordance with the standards 
established by the Commissioner of Public Safety of the State of 
Utah. 
The law enforcement officers used affidavits which do not 
fully reflect strict compliance with the standards established by 
the Commissioner of Public Safety of the State of Utah were 
followed in the calibrating and testing for accuracy of the 
Intoxilyzer used on Mr. Bennett. 
For the convenience of the Court, a copy of the applicable 
regulations from the Commissioner of Public Safety is attached 
for comparison with the actual affidavit which was used by the 
law enforcement officer conducting the testing of the machine. 
(See, Trial Exhibit C and appendix). 
The affidavit used by Layton City to certify that the 
Intoxilyzer was properly tested before and after the 
administration of the breath test to Mr. Bennett does not comply 
with the Breath Testing Regulations established by the 
Commissioner of Public Safety. Specifically, the following 
deficiencies are clearly apparent on the face of the affidavit 
when compared with the regulations of the Commissioner of Public 
Safety: 
1. The temperature check. (Paragraph 3 of the 
regulations) The affidavit does not specify whether the machine 
was warmed. 
2. Internal Purge Check. (paragraph 4 of the 
regulations) The affidavit does not indicate the mode selector 
40 
is on the air blank mode. 
3. Fixed Absorbtion Calibrator Check. (paragraph 5 of 
the regulations) The affidavit allows a variance of plus or 
minus .01% in the calibration setting, while the regulations 
allow no such variation. 
4. Simulator Check. (paragraph 6 of the regulations) 
The affidavit does not indicate that an air blank is run on the 
machine between each of the three tests ^s is required by the 
regulations. 
5. Printer Deactivator Check. (paragraph 7 of the 
regulations) The affidavit has no detailed checklist for the 
printer deactivator check as is set out in paragraph 3 of the 
regulations. 
Although the affidavit, paragraph 2, states the testing was 
performed according to standards, Murray v. Hall footnote 5, 
states that such an assertion is not sufficient, and a showing 
must be made that each and every step required in checking and 
calibrating the instrument was observed. The affidavits on their 
face clearly fail in that regard. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, Mr. Bennett argues first, the evidence sub-
mitted by Layton City should have been suppressed at the trial as 
being the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure. Second, two 
jurors should have been excluded by the court for cause, were not 
excluded for cause, therefore forcing Mr. Bennett to use two of 
his peremptory challenges on the two persons. 
Finally, evidence submitted on the issue of the proper 
functioning of the Intoxilyzer and Mr. Bennettfs blood alcohol 
level should not have been admitted by the Court for lack of 
foundation. The documentary evidence offered to establish the 
requisite foundational basis for admission of the test results is 
clearly hearsay evidence which does not fit within any of the 
exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
Mr. Bennett prays that judgment of the lower court be rever-
sed with direction to the lower court to enter a dismissal of 
the case. 
Dated this day of April, 1987. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed four true anc$ correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant to: 
Steven Garside 
Layton City Prosecutor 
437 North Wasatch Drive 
Layton, Utah 84041 
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on thet7l \ day of April, 1987, via United States Mail, postage 
prepaid. 
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Archives file #3531 
BREATH TESTIWG REGULATIONS 
Revised: April 1, 1981 
Archives file* 4714 
Revised: November 4,,1983" 
Archives file# 6734 
PEPARTMEWT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
I . TECHNIQUES OR METHODS 
A. Tests to determine the concentration of alcohol in a persons blood, 
may be applied to blood, breath or other bodily substances. Results 
shall be expressed as equivalent to grams of alcohol per one hundred 
(100) cubic centimeters of blood. The results of such tests shall be 
entered in a permanent record book. 
B. Written check lists, outlining the method of properly performing 
the tests in use under division A of this regulation, shall be 
available at each location where tests are given. The check list and 
the test record shall be retained by the operator administering the 
test or the arresting officer. 
Definition: 
A check list sets forth the steps, in sequence, that a breath 
test operator must follow. A square is provided by each of the 
steps for the operator to check each one as it is performed to 
insure proper operation of the test instrument. 
I I . BREATH TESTS 
A. Breath samples of alveolar air shall be analyzed with instruments 
specifically designed for the analysis of breath. The calculation 
of the blood alcohol concentration shall be on the basis of aveolar 
air to blood ratio of 2100:1. Breath samples shall be analyzed 
according to the methods described by the manufacturer of the 
instrument or instructions issued by the office of the Commissioner 
of Public Safety* 
TESTS FOR CHECKING CALIBRATION 
A. Breath testing instruments must be certified oh a routine basis 
not to exceed forty (40) days. 
B. Calibration tests must be performed by a technician using appropri-
ate solutions of ethyl alcohol, and using methods and techniques for 
checking calibration recommended by the manufacturer of the 
instrument or the office of the Commissioner of Public Safety. 
C. Results of test for calibration shall be kept in a permanent record 
book. A report of each calibration test shall be recorded on the 
appropriate form and sent to the supervisor of the Breath Testing 
Program. The supervisor of the Breath Testing Program is hereby 
designated as the official keeper of said records. 
PROCEDURE FOR CERTIFICATION OF INSTRUMENTS 
A. Breathalyzer 
1. Instrument heating properly: 
a. between 47 and 53 degrees centigrade 
2. Collection chamber output: 
a. COLD between 55 and 58 cc's 
b. WARM between 50 and 54 cc"s 
3. NULL meter functioning properly: 
a* Must be able to achieve a balance and swing freely in both 
directions. 
4. Read light in mechanical center: 
Place two ampoules of the same control number in the holders, 
turn on the read light, balance galvanometer and check for 
mechanical center. Switch the ampoules, turn on the read 
light. The null meter should not swing more than I inch in 
either direction. 
5. Blood alcohol pointer slippage check: 
Balance the instrument with ampoules in the holders. Set 
the blood alcohol pointer on .20%, or center of the Blood 
Alcohol scale. Using the light carriage adjustment, and with 
the read light on, run the B. A. needle to .00% and back to 
.20%, observing to see that the null meter balances at the 
same time the B. A. needle reaches .20%. Then run the B.A. 
needle to .40% and back to .20% observing to see that the null 
meter balances at the .20% line on the blood alcohol scale. 
6. Simulator Check: 
At least three (3) simulator checks of a known value shall be 
run on the instrument. The results must be within .01% plus 
or minus of the actual value of the known solution. 
7. Ampoule Check: 
A series of simulator tests with the accumulated total of .60% 
shall be run on an ampoule from each control number on hand 
with the instrument. The results of each simulator test must 
be within .01% plus or minus of the actual value. The ampoule 
should then be observed to see if there is a slight yellow color, 
indicating the presence of potasium dichromate. If it meets the 
above standards, the chemicals are correct or within allowed 
tolerances. 
B. Intoxilyzer 
1. Place the mode selector switch in the zero set mode. 
2. ELECTRICAL POWER CHECK: With the power switch on, 
observe to see that the power indicator light comes on, 
indicating there Is electrical power to the instrument. 
3. TEMPERATURE CHECK: If the instrument is already 
warmed up, check to see that the ready light is on. 
If it is not warmed up, wait approximately 10 minutes 
to see that the ready light comes on. (This light 
indicates that the sample chamber is heated to the 
proper temperature). 
4. INTERNAL PURGE CHECK: Put the mode selector in 
the air blank mode. Place thumb on the end of the pump 
tube to see that it is pumping air. Time the pumping 
sequence to see that it pumps for approximately 35 
seconds. 
5. ZERO SET AND ERROR INDICATOR CHECK: (AS Model) 
Set the mode selector in the zero set mode. Depress the 
zero adjust knob and adjust the digital display to a plus 
• 000, .001 , .002 or .003 to see that you can achieve a proper 
zero set. Re-set the digital display above the acceptable plus 
.000 to .003. Place the mode selector to the test mode and 
observe to see that the error light comes on. Repeat, placing 
the digital display at minus .000 and observe to see that the 
error light comes on when the mode selector is placed in the 
test mode. 
(ASA Model) 
Advance the test cycle to the zero set mode and see that 
the unit registers a reading of plus .000, .001, .002, or 
.003. If this reading is not observed, advance to the next 
cycle and see that the error light comes on. 
FIXED ABSORBTION CALIBRATOR CHECK: With the test 
card in the printer, run a test on the fixed absorbtion 
calibrator to see that the instrument gives the correct 
reading on the digital display and the printed test card. 
THIS CHECK NOT REQUIRED ON INSTRUMENTS NOT 
EQUIPPED WITH THE FIXED ABSORBTION CALIBRATOR. 
SIMULATOR CHECK : Run three tests on a simulator 
solution of a known value and an air blank before each 
one. Observe to see that the correct readings, within 
plus or minus .01% of the actual value is indicated on the 
digital display and printed on the test card for each simula-
tor test and a .00% reading for each air blank. 
PRINTER DEACTIVATOR CHECK: (AS Model) Run a 
simulator test with the zero set NOT in the proper zero 
set range, to see that the printer is deactivated and will 
not print . 
(ASA Model) 
This check must be performed before the unit is up to 
operating temperature . (before the ready lamp is on) 
Advance the unit to the first purge cycle (air blank). 
Observe the error light to see that it is lit. At the end 
of the test cycle (approximately 35 seconds), see that the 
pump stops and that the printer is deactivated and will 
not print . 
QUALIFICATIONS OF PERSONNEL 
A. Breath test shall be performed by a qualified operator who shall 
have completed the operators course prescribed by the Commissioner 
of Public Safety. Operators shall use only those instruments 
which they are certified to operate. 
B. Breath test operator certification requirements: 
1. Must have successfully completed training for each type of 
instrument and pass the required test, as approved by the 
Commissioner of Public Safety. 
2. Operators must complete an approved recertification training 
course and pass a test every two (2) years to maintain their 
certification. 
C. Breath test technician requirements: 
1. Must comply with one of the following: 
a. Must successfully complete the Breath Testing Supervisors 
course offered by Indiana State University. 
b. A manufacturers repair technician course for the breath 
testing instruments in use in the State of Utah. 
c. Be qualified by the nature of his employment or training 
to maintain and repair the breath testing instrument in 
question and to instruct in the proper operation of the 
instrument. 
REVOCATION OF CERTIFICATION 
A. The Commissioner of Public Safety may on the recommendation of 
a technician, revoke the certification of any operator: 
1. Who obtains a certification card falsely or deceitfully. 
2. Who fails to comply with the foregoing provisions governing 
the operation of breath test instruments. 
3. Who fails to demonstrate satisfactory performance in 
operating breath testing instruments. 
V I I . PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL 
The foregoing regulations shall not be construed as invalidating the 
qualification of personnel previously qualified as either breath test 
operators or breath test technicians under programs existing prior 
to the promulgation of these regulations. Such personnel shall be 
deemed certified until such time as retraining would have been re-
quired were these regulations not in effect. 
This provision shall take effect as if enacted contemporaneously with 
the other Breath Testing Regulations of the Department of Public 
Safety on June 11, 1979. 
In the opinion of the Department of Public Safety, it is necessary to 
the peace, health and welfare of the inhabitants of the State of Utah 
that this regulation become effective immediately. 
Training for original certification is to be conducted by a Breath 
Test Technician and should include the following: 
1 hour. . .Welcome, registration, preview of Alcohol and Traffic Safety. 
3 hours. .Effects of Alcohol in the Human Body. 
3 hours. .Operational Principles of Breath Testing. 
2 hours. .Alcoholic Influence Report Form. 
2 hours. .Testimony of the Arresting Officer. 
3 hours. .Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing. 
1 hour.. .Detecting the Drinking Driver. 
8 hours. .Laboratory Participation. (Running Simulator tests on the 
instruments and tests on actual drinking subjects). 
1 hour*. .Examination and Critiques of Course. 
Training for recertification is to be conducted by a Breath Testing 
Technician and should include the following: 
2 hours. .Effects of alcohol in the Human Body. 
2 hours. .Operational principles of Breath Testing. 
1 hour.. .Alcohol Influence Report Form and Testimony of arresting officer. 
2 hours..Legal Aspects of Chemical Testing and Detecting and the 
Drinking Driver. 
1 hour. . .Exam. 
Anyone having previously successfully completed a twenty-four (24) 
hour operators school, may be recertified at anytime by successfully 
completing an eight (8) hour recertification course, and also may be 
certified to operate another type of breath testing instrument after 
eight (8) hours instruction pertaining to the instrument in question. 
